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PROFESSIONAL SPORTS: RESTRAINING THE
LEAGUE COMMISSIONER'S PREROGATIVES
IN AN ERA OF PLAYER MOBILITY
Recent litigation has altered radically the balance of power in pro-
fessional sports." To expand negotiation rights and broaden the mar-
ket for their services, professional athletes have attacked such tradi-
tional practices as the player draft,2 the reserve clause,-' and the
perpetual option clause. 4 Challenges to those structural components,
which formerly were rationalized as a means of maintaining a com-
petitively balanced league, have affected the role of the commissioner,
1. See generally Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp. v. Major League Baseball
Players Ass'n, 409 F. Supp. 233 (W.D. Mo.), aff'd, 532 F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1976);
Mackey v. National Football League, 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Minn. 1975),
modified, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976); Smith v. Pro-Football, 420 F. Supp. 738
(D.D.C. 1976); Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); Kapp v. National Football League, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D.
Cal. 1974); Nassau Sports v. Peters, 352 F. Supp. 870 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Nassau
Sports v. Hampson, 355 F. Supp. 733 (D. Minn. 1972); Boston Professional
Hockey Ass'n v. Cheevers, 348 F. Supp. 261 (D. Mass. 1972); Philadelphia World
Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa.
1972); Lamat Corp. v. Barry, 275 Cal. App. 2d 671, 80 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1969);
In re Arbitration between American & National Leagues of Professional Baseball
Clubs (Oakland Athletics, Division of Charles 0. Finley & Co., Inc.) & Major
League Baseball Players Ass'n (James A. ("Catfish") Hunter), Decision No. 23
(Dec. 13, 1974) [hereinafter cited as Hunter Arbitration].
2. See note 48 inf!ra.
3. See id. For example, the reserve system has been dismantled partially in the
new standard agreement between owners of the various baseball clubs and the
players association, which eliminates the option clause in contracts of six-year
veterans executed after August 8, 1976. Basic Agreement between the American
League of Professional Baseball Clubs & the National League of Professional
Baseball Clubs & Major League Baseball Players Ass'n art. XVII, § B (2) (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Basic Agreement]. A similar arrangement exists in pro-
fessional football for four-year veterans. Collective Bargaining Agreement be-
tween National Football League Players Ass'n & National Football League
Management Council art. XIV, § 1 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Football Collec-
tive Bargaining Agreement].
In football and basketball, the player selection process now permits a player to
sign with another team if he cannot reach an agreement with the club that
selected him. Previously, the player either had to sign with his drafting team or
surrender his right to play. Id. art. XIII, §§ 1-9; Agreement between the Na-
tional Basketball Ass'n ("NBA") & the National Basketball Players Ass'n
("Players Ass'n") art. XVI, § 1(a) (1976) [hereinafter cited as Basketball
Collective Bargaining Agreement].
4. See note 43 infra.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
the regulator of a sport's daily operation.5 Although his authority
arises under the constitution and bylaws of the particular sport, the
commissioner's activities are specified contractuallyA The emergence
of collective bargaining agreements, prompted by court and arbitra-
tion decisions, has supplanted many of these contractual obligations.7
The creation of a free agent status, which enables some players who
have completed their contracts to market their services to any other
club in the league," has been the source of many disputes. Of the four
principal team sports in the United States, baseball, football, basket-
ball, and hockey, professional baseball has been affected most pro-
foundly by this innovation. In Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn 9 and
Atlanta National League Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn,10 federal dis-
trict courts in Illinois and Georgia delineated the authority of the
Commissioner of Baseball in the operation of the free agent draft. Al-
though both cases involved disputes between the Commissioner and
an owner," the decisions will have a significant impact on the newly-
established rights of professional athletes.
This Note will discuss the commissioner's power to affect player
mobility in the context of the courts' interpretations in Finley and
5. See, e.g., CONST. AND BY-LAwS FOR THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE art.
VIII (1976); CONST. OF NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE § 6.3(a) (1947, amended
1975) (President of the league) ; Major League Agreement art. I, §§ 1-7 (1975)
(baseball).
6. See, e.g., CONST. AND BY-LAws FOR THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE (1976);
CONST. OF NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE (1947, amended 1975); Major League Agree-
ment (1975).
7. The Basic Agreement grievance procedure, for example, preempts in part
the baseball Commissioner's power to arbitrate disputes. Basic Agreement, supra
note 3, art. X; Major League Agreement art. VII, § 1 (1975).
8. Football Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 3, arts. XIV-XV;
Basketball Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 3, art. XVI; Basic
Agreement, supra note 3, art. XVII: By-Laws of the National Hockey League
§ 9A (1948, amended 1975).
9. Cause No. 76C2358 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 7, 1976).
10. 432 F. Supp. 1213 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
11. Such disputes are not unique. As early as 1931, a baseball owner attempted
to prevent the Commissioner from voiding a sale of a player. Milwaukee Am.
Ass'n v. Landis, 49 F.2d 298 (N.D. Ill. 1931). In Landis, the St. Louis major
league team sought to assign a player, Bennett, to a minor league club in Mil-
waukee and to reserve the right to recall him. Ball was the controlling owner
of the St. Louis team and several minor league teams, including that in Mil-
waukee. The owner shuttled Bennett between his major and minor league teams,
and other major league clubs, unaware of Ball's clandestine dominion over the
player, were prevented from exercising their right to acquire the latter's services.
The court upheld the Commissioner's decision, voiding the transfer and removing
Bennett's obligations to both St. Louis and Milwaukee.
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Atlanta National League of baseball's Major League Agreement and
collective bargaining agreement. Although the existing player mobility
in football, basketball, and hockey has resulted from charges of anti-
trust violations brought by the athletes against their leagues,12 players
in baseball, which is exempt from the antitrust laws,13 have achieved
similar freedom through arbitration. 14 The authority of the Baseball
Commissioner to intervene in free agency disputes therefore parallels
that of commissioners in other sports, 5 and the legal developments in
baseball inevitably will affect the course of all major professional
sports in the United States.
This Note also will examine the role of club owners in the free
agency environment. Subject to disciplinary sanctions by the commis-
sioner for over-zealous efforts to obtain players in the open market, 6
owners presently enjoy little legal protection against arbitrary deci-
sions by the commissioner. Two protective measures, however, may
12. See Mackey v. National Football League, 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Minn.
1975), modified, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976) ; Robertson v. National Basketball
Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Kapp v. National Football League,
390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Nassau Sports v. Peters, 352 F. Supp. 870
(E.D.N.Y. 1972); Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey
Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
13. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc.,
346 U.S. 356 (1953); Federal Baseball Club, Inc. v. National League of Profes-
sional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). In Flood the Court recognized that
baseball's exemption from the antitrust laws was an "aberration." 407 U.S. at
282. Nevertheless, in the absence of congressional action, the Court determined
that the historical anomaly was entitled to stare decisis. Id. at 284-86. The
exemption has not been repealed by Congress, notwithstanding its unavailability
to other sports. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282-83 (1972); Haywood v.
National Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1971); Rado-
vich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957); Nassau Sports v. Hamp-
son, 355 F. Supp. 733 (D. Minn. 1972); Boston Prof. Hockey Ass'n v. Cheevers,
348 F. Supp. 261 (D. Mass. 1972). See also Washington Professional Basketball
Corp. v. National Basketball Ass'n, 147 F. Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
14. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n,
409 F. Supp. 233 (W.D. Mo.), aff'd, 532 F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1976) (affirming the
Messersmith and McNally arbitration decision that limited baseball's reserve
clause to a one-year option period) ; Hunter Arbitration, supra note 1.
15. All four major sports have attempted to increase player mobility through
the negotiation of collective bargaining agreements containing clauses that
reduce the commissioners' role in the restriction of player movement. Football
Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 3, arts. VII, XIV-XV; Basketball
Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 3, arts. XV-XVI; Basic Agreement,
supra note 3, arts. V, X, XVI-XVII; Collective Bargaining Agreement between
the National Hockey League Players Ass'n & the National Hockey League
Member Clubs art. IV (1976) [hereinafter cited as NHL Collective Bargaining
Agreement].
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be available to the owner: he could use the collective bargaining agree-




The commissioner of a sports league serves as the principal officer
of an unincorporated association. 17 Defined as a group of persons who
have united for a particular purpose, an association differs from a
partnership in that the former is created to obtain profits for its
members rather than for the organization itself."' Neither a corpora-
tion nor a partnership, the association has an ambiguous legal status
that is unrecognized in some states.'9
Because state statutory provisions governing unincorporated asso-
ciations are fragmented and inadequate, '20 many courts bypass the
statutes altogether in favor of common law doctrines.21 One frequently
invoked principle, that of judicial non-interference, precludes a court
from meddling in the internal affairs of an unincorporated association
except to protect property and civil rights or to prevent fraud.22 As a
result, judicial recourse may be denied any member who has failed to
16. The relatively open player market probably will encourage aggressive
owners to purchase as much talent as possible. Since the conclusion of the 1976
baseball season, the wealthier clubs, including the New York Yankees, the Boston
Red Sox, the Texas Rangers, the California Angels, and the San Diego Padres,
have invested large amounts in free agents. If the owners' conduct is considered
overzealous by the commissioner, they undoubtedly will pursue legal remedies to
protect their activities.
17. CONST. AND BY-LAws FOR THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE arts. II, § 2,
VII, § 1(a) (1976); CONST. OF NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE (1947, amended 1975);
Major League Agreement art. 1 (1975).
18. H. OLECK, NON-PROFIT CORPORATIONS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND ASsOcIA-
TIONS 59-60 (3d ed. 1975).
19. Id. at 63.
20. Id. at 61-62.
21. At common law, the unincorporated association was not a legal entity and
therefore could be sued only in a representative capacity. Recently, however,
some courts have recognized the organizations' separate legal existence. See, e.g.,
Inglis v. Operating Eng'rs Local 12, 58 Cal. 2d 269, 373 P.2d 467, 23 Cal. Rptr.
403 (1962); Marshall v. Local 6, ILWU, 57 Cal. 2d 781, 371 P.2d 987, 22 Cal.
Rptr. 211 (1962); Operating Eng'rs Local 12 v. Fair Employment Practice
Comm'n, 276 Cal. App. 2d 504, 81 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1969). Contra, Donovan v.
Travers, 285 Mass. 167, 188 N.E. 705 (1934).
22. See, e.g., Berrien v. Pollitzer, 165 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (inherent right
involved); Quimby v. School Dist. No. 21, 10 Ariz. App. 69, 455 P.2d 1019 (1969)
(civil rights involved) ; Krause v. Sander, 66 Misc. 601, 122 N.Y.S. 54 (1910)
(expulsion of labor union member) ; H. OLECK, supra note 18, at 84.
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exhaust all remedies available under association rules. 23 Even if a
member successfully instigates a suit, to prevail he must show the
illegality of the acts directed against him. His receipt of harsh treat-
ment from an association officer does not provide cause for relief;
rather, the discipline or punishment must have been sufficiently
arbitrary to place the officer's action outside his official capacity.2 4
Although most courts adhere to the concept of judicial non-inter-
ference, they often ignore the doctrine in cases involving sports
leagues. Instead, disputes over a commissioner's disciplinary actions
are resolved by reference both to the contractual powers conferred
on the commissioner and to the league's internal management.25 Simi-
lar to most unincorporated associations, the management of a sports
league is conducted according to the association articles,20 which
usually consist of a constitution and by-laws. The constitution outlines
the basic structure and power relationships within the organization;
the more detailed by-laws set forth the rules, regulations, and pro-
cedures applicable to association members.27 Together, the constitution
and by-laws of the various sports leagues establish the contractual
authority of their commissioners.
23. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 159 F.2d 822, 825-26
(5th Cir. 1947); Jennings v. Jennings, 91 N.E.2d 899, 902 (Ohio App. 1949).
Notwithstanding a petitioner's failure to exhaust the remedies provided by the
association, a court will intervene if it determines that such a requirement would
be futile. Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 205-207 (1944).
24. Atlanta Nat'l League Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 432 F. Supp. 1213, 1218
(N.D. Ga. 1977); Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, Cause No. 76C2358, slip op. at
3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 7, 1976).
25. Atlanta Nat'l League Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 432 F. Supp. 1213
(N.D. Ga. 1977); Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, Cause No. 76C2358 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 7, 1976) ; Professional Sports, Ltd. v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 373
F. Supp. 946 (W.D. Tex. 1974); Milwaukee Am. Ass'n v. Landis, 49 F.2d 298
(N.D. Ill. 1931); Lemat Corp. v. Barry, 275 Cal. App. 2d 671, 80 Cal. Rptr. 240
(1969).
26. See H. OLECK, supra note 18, at 62-63. In baseball, the association articles
consist of the Major League Agreement (1975), the Major League Rules, and
the Basic Agreement, supra note 3. In professional football, the articles include
the CO sT. AND BY-LAWS FOR THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE (1976) and the
Football Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 3. The pertinent documents
in professional basketball include the By-Laws of the National Basketball Associ-
ation and the Basketball Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 3. In
hockey, the articles consist of the By-Laws of the National Hockey League,
(1948, amended 1975), the CONST. OF THE NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE (1947,
amended 1975) and the NHL Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 15.
27. H. OLECK, supra note 18, at 63. In baseball, the Major League Agreement
(1975) is the association's constitution; the Major League Rules and the Basic
Agreement, supra note 3, function as its by-laws.
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The Structure of Major League Baseball
The constitution of professional baseball, the Major League Agree-
ment,28 defines the organizational components of the league. 29 At the
core of this structure is the Executive Council, a seven-member super-
visory body responsible for the operation of the association and for
the welfare of the game. 30 Although the Commissioner is entrusted
with extensive authority,31 the Executive Council holds ultimate
power: it initially submits recommendations for the position of Com-
missioner to other league members 32 and has the sole authority to
approve the Commissioner's budget requests for financing his office. 33
Although the Commissioner is a member of the Executive Council, 34
he is not an association member; rather, he is an officer, elected to
seven-year terms 35 for the purpose of conducting certain association
affairs.3 6
28. Major League Agreement (1975).
29. The Major League Agreement creates three offices to oversee the associa-
tion's operation: the Commissioner, the Executive Council, and the Secretary-
Treasurer. Major League Agreement arts. I, § 1; II, § 1; III (1975). The Secre-
tary-Treasurer is appointed by the Commissioner, but he must be approved by the
Executive Council. The Executive Council, at whose pleasure the Secretary-
Treasurer holds office, also determines his salary. Id. art. III.
30. The Executive Council has jurisdiction: "To COOPERATE, advise and
confer with the Commissioner and other offices, agencies and individuals in an
effort to perpetuate Baseball as the national game of America, and to surround
it with such safeguards as may warrant absolute public confidence in its
integrity, operations and methods." Id. art. II, § 2 (a) Members of the Executive
Council include the Commissioner, the presidents of the two major leagues, and
four other association members who are elected annually by the leagues. Id. art.
II, § 1.
31. See id. arts. I; II, § 4; Ill-IV; V, §§ 1(a), 2, 3; VII. Contractual in nature,
the Commissioner's powers arise under the Major League Agreement (1975), the
Major League Rules, the Basic Agreement, supra note 3, and the Uniform
Player's Contract, which refers to the former documents as supplemental provi-
sions to that agreement. In Atlanta National League the court stated that the
Major League Agreement "constitutes a contract between the two baseball league
associations .... The Agreement establishes the office of the defendant, the Com-
missioner of Baseball, and defines his authority, powers and responsibilities." 432
F. Supp. at 1215 (emphasis supplied). See also Milwaukee Am. Ass'n v. Landis, 49
F.2d 298, 299 (N.D. Ill. 1931).
32. Major League Agreement art. II, § 2(e) (1975).
33. Id. art. II, § 2(f).
34. Id. art. II, § 1. The Commissioner also is the permanent chairman of the
Executive Council. Id. art. II, § 4.
35. Id. art. I, § 6.
36. Id. art. I. Under the Major League Agreement, the Commissioner may suc-
ceed himself. Id. The Executive Council's power to recommend candidates for his
office requires a commissioner desiring reelection to satisfy the Executive Council
or risk severance for unsatisfactory performance.
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The broadest of the Commissioner's powers derives from the Major
League Agreement's sweeping "best interest" of baseball clause: he
may take "preventive, remedial or punitive action" against those who,
in his opinion, are not acting in the best interests of baseball.3 7 The
Major League Rules are a second source of disciplinary authority,
enabling the Commissioner to impose fines for player misconduct 38
37. In detail, the Commissioner's functions include:
(a) TO INVESTIGATE, either upon complaint or upon his own
initiative, any act, transaction or practice charged, alleged or sus-
pected to be not in the best interests of the national game of Baseball,
with authority to summon persons and to order the production of
documents, and, in case of refusal to appear or produce, to impose
such penalties as are hereinafter provided.
(b) TO DETERMINE, after investigation, what preventive, remedial
or punitive action is appropriate in the premises, and to take such
action either against Major Leagues, Major League Clubs or in-
dividuals, as the case may be.
(c) TO HEAR and determine finally any dispute between the Major
Leagues which may be certified to him for determination by the Presi-
dent of either Major League.
Id. art. I, §§ 2(a)-(c).
The Commissioner may impose one or more of the following sanctions if he
finds a party guilty of conduct not within the best interest of the game:
(a) a reprimand; (b) deprivation of a Major League Club of repre-
sentation in joint meetings; (c) suspension or removal of any officer
or employee of a Major League or a Major League Club; (d) tempo-
rary or permanent ineligibility of a player; and (e) a fine, not to
exceed Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) in the case of a Major
League or a Major League Club and not to exceed Five Hundred
Dollars ($500.00) in the case of any officer, employee or player.
Id. art. I, § 3. For recent applications by the Commissioner of the best interests
clause see Atlanta Nat'l League Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 432 F. Supp. 1213,
1218 (N.D. Ga. 1977) (clause used to suspend owner for tampering with a
potential free agent); Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, Cause No. 76C2358
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 7, 1976) (clause used to void cash sales of three players).
38. See Major League Rules 15, 16 & 21. The extent of the Commissioner's
power to discipline players is beyond the scope of this Note. For a discussion of
this topic see Weistart, Player Discipline in Professional Sports: The Antitrust
Issues, 18 WM. & MARY L. Rnv. 703 (1977).
Both major league players and clubs are subject to the Commissioner's dis-
cipline. Article VII of the Major League Agreement (1975) provides in pertinent
part:
Sec. 2. The Major Leagues and their constituent clubs, severally
agree to be bound by the decisions of the Commissioner, and the
discipline imposed by him under the provisions of this Agreement,
and severally -waive such right of recourse to the courts as would
otherwise have existed in their favor.
Sec. 3. The form of player's contract to be used by the Major
Leagues, and all contracts between Major Leagues or Clubs and their
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and to suspend anyone connected with baseball who has engaged
in outcome betting.3"1 In addition, the Commissioner acts as arbitrator
for certain disputes, 40 and he retains the power to reinstate those
players and personnel he has suspended.41 As one district court judge
noted, the Commissioner has "all the attributes of a benevolent but
absolute despot and all the disciplinary powers of a proverbial pater
familias." 42
ANTITRUST ISSUES
Recent antitrust challenges by professional athletes against club
owners principally have challenged sports leagues reserve systems.43
officers and employees, shall contain a clause by which the parties
agree to submit themselves to the discipline of the Commissioner,
and to accept his decisions rendered in accordance with this Agree-
ment.
Id. art. VII, §§ 2-3.
39. Major League Rule 21(d). If a player, club, or league official bets on any
baseball contest in which he is involved, he will be suspended for one year. If the
person bet on a game in which he must perform, he will be barred permanently
from future association with the league. Id. In 1970, Denny McLain, a pitcher
for the Detroit Tigers, was suspended for almost one-half of the season after
associating with gamblers. N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1970, at 48, col. 1.
40. Major League Agreement art. VII, § 1 (1975). This provision stipulates
that all controversies, whether between clubs, players and clubs, or clubs and
their employees and officers, "other than those whose resolution is expressly
provided for by another means in this Agreement . . . or the Basic Agreement
between the Major Leagues and the Major League Baseball Players Association,
shall be submitted to the Commissioner, as Arbitrator." Id. The Basic Agreement
provides for salary and grievance arbitration but permits the submission of
these matters to independent arbitrators rather than to the Commissioner. Basic
Agreement, supra note 3, arts. V, §§ E; X.
41. Major League Rule 16(a). The Commissioner also is authorized to propose
new rules and regulations to the leagues. Major League Agreement art. IV
(1975).
42. Milwaukee Am. Ass'n v. Landis, 49 F.2d 298, 299 (N.D. Ill. 1931).
43. In baseball, for example, until 1976 the "reserve system" permitted a club
to renew its annual contract with each team member. This practice "essentially
bound a player to a team perpetually unless traded or released." Atlanta Nat'l
League Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 432 F. Supp. 1213, 1215 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
Football's reserve system bound a player who contracted with a club to play
for that team unless he was traded or released for the duration of the contract
plus one extra year if desired by the club. Mackey v. National Football League,
543 F.2d 606, 610 (8th Cir. 1976). Thus, unlike a baseball player of the 1960's
and early 1970's, a football player could attain "free agent" status, which per-
mitted him to bargain with other clubs. He could achieve this status by complying
with his contract for its duration plus an additional or "option" year, refraining
from signing another contract, and accepting a salary reduction of ten percent
during his option year. Id. Before 1963, no club signing a free agent was com-
pelled to compensate the player's former team for the loss of his services. Id.
[Vol. 19:281
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Once instigated, however, the antitrust challenges affected both the
entire network of player controls and the commensurate authority of
sports' commissioners.
Football
Prior to antitrust attacks in the 1970's, five devices controlled a
player's mobility in professional football: the draft, the option clause,
the Rozelle Rule, the standard player contract, and the tampering
rule.44 The Commissioner had a prominent role in the operation of the
latter three practices.45
Although the Rozelle Rule enabled an athlete completing his option
year to join another club in the National Football League (NFL) ,4,
it obligated his new employer to compensate the player's previous club.
If the two teams disagreed as to compensation, the Commissioner
would resolve the dispute4 7 usually awarding high draft choices to
the former employer.4 8 Because early round draft choices often con-
stitute the nucleus around which a team may ensure future success,
their use as compensation inevitably deterred many clubs from ex-
ploiting the free agent market. 9 The consequent deflated market
In 1963, however, the Rozelle Rule was added to the National Football League's
constitution and by-laws, thus requiring a club acquiring a free agent to com-
pensate the athlete's former team. Id. For further discussion of the Rozelle Rule
see text accompanying note 46 infra.
44. Mackey v. National Football League, 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Minn. 1975),
modified, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976); Kapp v. National Football League, 309
F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
45. CONST. AND BY-LAws FOR THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE arts. IX, § 2;
XII, § 1(H); XV, § 1 (1976).
46. See note 43 supra.
47. Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 610-11 (8th Cir. 1976).
48. Mackey v. National Football League, 407 F. Supp. 1000, 1004-05 (D. Minn.
1975), modified, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976). Following each football season,
the NFL conducts a draft, during which member teams select new recruits for
17 rounds in an order inversely related to their winning percentages for the
previous season. Selections are made primarily from among those athletes who
recently have concluded their college eligibility. CONST. AND BY-LAWS FOR THE
NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE art. XIV (1976). Following its selection of a recruit,
the club may bargain exclusively for the services of that athlete. Id. § 4.
49. The case of Dick Gordon exemplifies the destructive effect that the Rozelle
Rule had on a player's attempts to play out his option and to sign with another
team as a free agent. Gordon became a free agent in 1972 after he had com-
pleted his option year for the Chicago Bears. Several teams sought Gordon's
services, but none could agree with the Bears on satisfactory compensation terms.
When the season began, Gordon remained unsigned. Commissioner Rozelle then
intervened by announcing publicly the amount of compensation he would require
a team signing Gordon to pay the Bears. Gordon's agent testified that although
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made the athletes reluctant to play out their option year and to offer
their services to the highest bidder.50
Because the Rozelle Rule was set forth in the league constitution and
by-laws, it in turn was incorporated into the NFL's standard player
contract. 51 Consequently, a player's eligibility, which was contingent
upon signing the contract,52 required his acceptance of the compensa-
tion rule. In addition, the contract appointed the Commissioner as the
final arbitrator of all disputes, whether between players, clubs, or
players and clubs, 53 and empowered him to disapprove, without a hear-
ing, any player agreements executed in violation of or contrary to
league by-laws.54 Thus, the Commissioner not only could exert con-
trol over player mobility within the league, but he also could prevent
altogether a player's participation in the game.
The Commissioner also had authority over the enforcement of the
tampering rule, which prohibited negotiations with a player under
contract until the May following his option year. The Commissioner
possessed the authority to determine whether a club had violated the
tampering rule; 55 if he so decided, a club could be fined or expelled
from the league.50 The rule was deemed necessary to maintain the
integrity of football; it ensured that players under contract would not
compete against clubs with which they were negotiating. Nevertheless,
the tampering rule also reduced competition for a player's services by
limiting the time for negotiating a new contract: 57 in effect, the
player had only the short period between May and the commencement
of summer camp to arrange contract terms with a new team.
A California federal district court in 1974 undertook the first
judicial examination of the Rozelle Rule, the standard player contract,
the tampering rule, the draft, and the option clause. Alleging that
the New Orleans Saints were interested in Gordon, that club would not sign him
because the Bears were making unreasonable demands and the Saints were un-
willing to rely on the Commissioner's decision. Mackey v. National Football
League, 543 F.2d 606, 620 (8th Cir. 1976).
50. Marlin Briscoe could not secure the one-year contract with the Miami
Dolphins that he desired, and he had to accept a long-term agreement. According
to Briscoe, Miami would agree to nothing else "because of what they would have
to give up." Id. at 620 n.28.
51. See NFL Player Contract 2, 4.
52. CONST. AND BY-LAwS FOR THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE art. XV, § 6
(1976).
53. Id. art. VIII, §§ 3 (e), 5.
54. Id. art. VIII, § 14(a).
55. Id. art. VIII, § 3 (e).
56. Id. art. IX, § 2.
57. Mackey v. National Football League, 407 F. Supp. 1000, 1006 (D. Minn.
1975), modified, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
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NFL's members had combined to refuse to deal with players, the
plaintiff in Kapp v. National Football League 58 charged that such
practices constituted a boycott that was illegal per se under the anti-
trust laws.59 The unique qualities of a sports association, in which
members compete on the field but not in a business sense, led the court
to find no per se violation of the Sherman Act. Instead, it applied the
rule of reason test,60 under which a challenged restraint will be upheld
if it is "justified by legitimate business purposes, and is no more re-
strictive than necessary." 61 Because the effect of the Rozelle Rule
58. 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974). In 1970, Joe Kapp, a quarterback, was
playing in his option year for the Minnesota Vikings when he was traded to the
New England Patriots. Kapp agreed orally to play three years with the Patriots
for $600,000, and thereafter he played the 1970 season. At the beginning of the
next season, however, Kapp reported to training camp but refused to sign a
standard player contract. When he was prohibited from playing, Kapp brought
suit against the NFL. Id. at 75-78.
59. Kapp argued that the practices constituted "a combination among defend-
ants to refuse to deal with playdrs" and that such refusal amounted to a boy-
cott which was illegal per se under the antitrust laws. Id. at 78. See also HOUSE
SELECT COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL SPORTS, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., PROFESSIONAL
SPORTS AND THE LAW 15 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter cited as PROFESSIONAL
SPORTS AND THE LAW].
Certain practices in businesses other than sports are sufficiently anti-competi-
tive that they have been determined to be illegal per se. See, e.g., United States
v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967) (horizontal price fixing); Klor's, Inc. v.
Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959) (group boycott). A finding
of illegality per se not only relieves plaintiffs of the problems generally en-
countered when they seek redress under the antitrust laws, but it also permits
courts to avoid the task of applying the rule of reason test, whereby the benefits
and harms of an anticompetitive activity are weighed. Robertson v. National
Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867, 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Circumstances must be
compelling, however, before the per se rule will be applied: they must involve
"agreements which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of
any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore
illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the
business excuse for their use." Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5
(1958).
60. 390 F. Supp. 73, 81-82 (N.D. Cal. 1974). The "rule of reason" requires a
weighing of prospective benefits and costs to determine the legality of the activity
in question. See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36,
49-50 (1977) ; Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238-39, 241
(1918); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59-60 (1911).
61. Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 620 (8th Cir. 1976).
The court must examine the allegedly anticompetitive agreement in the context
of the history and economics of the industry involved. "If supported by clear
economic necessity, and its dominant purpose was not restraint of trade, the
practice would be declared reasonable and lawful." Robertson v. National Basket-
ball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867, 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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"would be to perpetually restrain a player from pursuing his occupa-
tion," 62 the court determined that it violated the Sherman Act.63 On
the same reasoning, the court invalidated the tampering rule, the
draft, and the "one-man rule," which had authorized the Commissioner
to act as arbitrator.64
Two years later, in Mackey v. National Football League,65 the Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reached a similar conclusion. Al-
though reversing a decision by the district court, which had deter-
mined that the Rozelle Rule per se violated the Sherman Act, the
Eighth Circuit nevertheless found that the practice constituted an
illegal restraint of trade.6 6 Moreover, the court in Mackey determined
that the Rozelle Rule failed to qualify for the "labor exemption" to
the antitrust laws, 67 which is available only if a practice or restraint
is a mandatory subject of collective bargaining and is implemented
after good faith arm's-length negotiations between the parties.68 Al-
though the Rozelle Rule met the first condition, it never had been
the subject of good faith negotiations and thus was not immune to
antitrust liability. 69 The court noted, however, that because the Rozelle
Rule was a mandatory subject of collective bargaining, immunity
from the Sherman Act would be possible if agreement on the practice
were reached through good faith negotiations. 70 Following Mackey,
therefore, the owners initiated negotiations with the players' union
and subsequently settled on football's current collective bargaining
agreement.7 1
Basketball
Basketball players won similar collective bargaining rights follow-
ing the 1975 decision in Robertson v. National Basketball Associa-
62. 390 F. Supp. 73, 82 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
66. Id. at 618-20.
67. Id. at 611-16, 623. The labor exemption, contained in § 6 and § 20 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1970) ; 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1970), has been construed
by the Supreme Court to protect labor union activity that would be illegal if
engaged in by businessmen. See, e.g., Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325
U.S. 797, 803-06 (1945).
68. 543 F.2d at 623.
69. Id. For the Rozelle Rule to qualify as an exempted activity, the union
must have engaged in "arm's-length bargaining in pursuit of [its] own labor
union policies." Meat Cutters Local Union 189 v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 690
(1965).
70. 543 F.2d at 623.
71. See notes 80-94 infra & accompanying text.
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tion.72 Attacking a proposed merger between the National Basketball
Association (NBA) and the American Basketball Association (ABA),
several athletes alleged that the two leagues had conspired to restrain
competition for the services of professional basketball players through
such practices as the college draft, the reserve clause and its attached
compensation plan, and other boycotting and blacklisting devices.7 3 A
New York federal district court denied the NBA's motion for sum-
mary judgment and rejected the league's formulation of a test under
which the NBA could have qualified for the labor exemption from
antitrust liability.7 4 Noting that the labor exemption issue would be
paramount at full trial, the court expressed difficulty in conceiving
of "any theory or set of circumstances pursuant to which [these
practices] could be saved from Sherman Act condemnation." 7. Al-
though the case was settled while pending on appeal, this dictum in
Robertson evinced increasing judicial suspicion of restraints on player
mobility. The settlement in Robertson was significant in that it led to
the formation of basketball's collective bargaining agreement.
Hockey
Antitrust litigation in hockey closely paralleled the developments
in football and basketball. In 1972, some players left the National
Hockey League (NHL) to join the new World Hockey Association
(WHA), thereby prompting a series of cases before federal district
courts questioning the permissible duration of hockey's reserve
clause." These actions established that the labor exemption from the
antitrust laws was inapplicable to hockey7 ,7 and that the reserve
72. 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
73. Id. at 873. These practices were similar to those existing prior to the anti-
trust attacks in the NFL. See notes 44-57 supra & accompanying text.
74. Id. at 884-89. The court adopted the following test in rejecting the league's
contention:
'The test of whether labor union action is or is not within the pro-
hibitions of the Sherman Act is (1) whether the action is in the
union's self-interest in an area which is a proper subject of union
concern and (2) whether the union is acting in combination with a
group of employers.'
Id. at 889 (quoting Intercontinental Container Transport Corp. v. New York
Shipping Ass'n, 312 F. Supp. 562 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 426 F.2d
884, 887 (2d Cir. 1970)).
75. 389 F. Supp. at 895.
76. For a general discussion of the reserve system's operation in professional
sports see note 43 supra.
77. Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n v. Cheevers, 348 F. Supp. 261, 265 (D.
Mass. 1972).
1977]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
clause, which was interpreted as creating at most one-year options, 78
probably would violate sections one and two of the Sherman Act.79
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS
Football
After the Kapp and Mackey decisions, the NFL adopted a collective
bargaining agreement that substantially altered the Commissioner's
power to restrict player mobility within the league.80 The "right of
first refusal" doctrine, which replaced the Rozelle Rule,"1 enables a
free agent's original team to retain the player if it matches the best
offer he receives from another club. If the first team fails to exer-
cise this right of first refusal, the athlete may sign with another
club.8 2 Under such circumstances, the former club may qualify for com-
pensation from the new employer.8 3 Unlike the previous practice, how-
ever, the Commissioner does not determine the amount of compensa-
tion; rather, section twelve of the new collective bargaining agreement
creates categories, based on the free agent's salary with his new club,
that determine which of its draft choices 84 the acquiring team must
surrender to the former employer.8 5' In alleviating the compensation
rule's uncertainty, section twelve enhances the opportunities for
player mobility.
The NFL's collective bargaining agreement also has modified the
tampering rule 6 to permit commencement of negotiations in
78. Nassau Sports v. Peters, 352 F. Supp. 870, 882 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
79. Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc.,
351 F. Supp. 462, 517-19 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n v.
Cheevers, 348 F. Supp. 261, 265-70 (D. Mass. 1972).
80. Football Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 3, arts. XII-XV
(1977) (effective March 1, 1977). The mandatory option year clause was deleted
from the contracts of four-year veterans but was retained in all contracts signed
by rookie players. Moreover, if a club unilaterally invokes the option clause con-
tained in such contracts, it must pay the player no less than 110% of his previous
year's salary. Id. art. XIV, §§ 1-3. The college draft, which was modified, is now
less restrictive of player movement. Id. art. XIII.
81. See notes 45-47 supra & accompanying text.
82. Football Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 3, art. XV, §§ 3-10.
83. A six-year veteran must be offered at least $50,000 per year before his
former team can qualify for compensation; a veteran of seven years must be
offered no less than $55,000. Under the compensation rule, the more years of
service a player has rendered, the larger a salary he must be offered before his
previous employer becomes eligible to receive compensation. See id. art. XV, § 11.
84. See note 48 supra.
85. Football Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 3, art. XV, § 12.
86. See text accompanying notes 55-57 supra.
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February, 7 rather than in May, thus allowing a free agent more time
to reach agreement with his new team. Although the Commissioner
retains authority to determine infractions of the tampering rule and
to punish violators, 8 the extended time period for negotiations may
render tampering unnecessary. As a result, the new rule places fewer
restrictions on player mobility yet continues to ensure the game's
integrity.
Altered NFL procedures necessarily have affected the standard
player contract, which incorporates into its terms the collective bar-
gaining agreement as well as the association's by-laws and consti-
tution. 9 The right of contract approval still rests with the Commis-
sioner,90 although the new collective bargaining agreement empowers
an aggrieved player to present his dispute to an impartial arbitration
panel."' Despite this safeguard against arbitrary Commissioner action,
however, danger remains: if the player's contract dispute does not
fall within the agreement's definition of "grievance," .2 resort to
arbitration is prohibited, and the Commissioner can resolve the
matter.9 3 Nevertheless, until the standard player contract is reformed
to comply with the collective bargaining agreement, 94 uncertainty will
exist as to the situations in which the Commissioner unilaterally may
disapprove any player's contract.
Basketball
The NBA's collective bargaining agreement, formulated while
Robertson was on appeal,95 contains provisions resembling those in
the NFL's agreement delineating the right of first refusal and
87. Football Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 3, art. XV, § 2.
88. CONST. AND BY-LAwS FOR THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE art. IX, § 2
(1976).
89. See note 51 supra & accompanying text.
90. CONST. AND BY-LAwS FOR THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE art. XV, § 4
(1976).
91. Football Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 3, art. VII (1976).
92. Subject to enumerated exceptions, an arbitrable non-injury grievance is
defined by the NFL collective bargaining agreement as: "Any dispute . . . in-
volving the interpretation or application of, or compliance with, provisions of
this Agreement... the Standard Player Contract... the NFL Player Contract
*, the Bert Bell NFL Player Retirement Plan and Trust Agreement.. and
the NFL Constitution and Bylaws .... ." Id. art. VII, § 1.
93. CONST. AND BY-LAwS FOR THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE art. VIII, § 3
(1976).
94. Football Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 3, art. XII, § 1.
95. PROFESSIONAL SPORTS AND THE LAW, supra note 59, at 19.
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grievance arbitration.'"" Two other NBA provisions, however, vest ex-
tensive power with the Commissioner. First, the tampering rule
remains intact, enabling the Commissioner to determine and to punish
violations."7 Second, the new agreement provides the Commissioner
with the sole authority to fix compensation after a free agent changes
teams,"'- a power previously possessed by the football commissioner
under the defunct Rozelle Rule. The basketball Commissioner's power
to fix compensation, however, lapses in 1981." Notwithstanding the
tampering provision, therefore, the NBA has attempted to eliminate
restrictive league practices gradually to maintain stability during the
transition from a closed to an open player market.
Hockey
Responding to legal developments in the other three major profes-
sional sports, competing with the WHA, and attempting to qualify for
the antitrust laws' labor exemption, the NHL concluded a collective
bargaining agreement with the hockey players association in 1975.
The agreement, which remains effective until 1980,100 incorporates
the compensation rule that first became effective in 1973.101 This
"'equalization rule" differs from the compensation provision of the
NFL and NBA; it provides that an arbitrator will resolve disputes
between teams as to compensatory amounts. 1 2 The arbitrator, who is
selected periodically by the Board of Governors,103 may award as com-
pensation either draft choices or player contract assignments. 0 4 This
rule eliminates involvement by the hockey league president in any
stage of the dispute, promoting an unbiased decision-making process.
96. See Basketball Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 3, arts. XVI,
§ 1 (d) ; XV. In addition, the agreement contains player-draft provisions that are
similar to those used in NFL. See id. art. XVI, § 1 (a).
97. CONST. OF THE NATIONAL BASKETBALL Ass'N § 35 (g).
98. If a free agent signs with a new team, that club must compensate the
player's previous employer. If the two teams disagree as to the appropriate com-
pensation, the Commissioner may make an award based on any or all of three
alternatives: draft choices, cash, or assignments of one or more player contracts.
Id. art. XVI, § 1(c) (1).
99. From the completion of the 1980-81 NBA season until the termination of
the 1986-87 season, no compensation rule will be in effect. Id. art. XVI, § 1(d) (1).
100. NHL Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 15, Preface (1976).
101. By-Laws of the National Hockey League § 9A.
102. Id. § 9A.8(a).
103. Id.
104. Id. § 9A.8(c). The arbitrator also may award cash as compensation, but
"only as a last resort." Id. § 9A.8(c) (iii).
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The NHL president has retained full power to approve player con-
tracts lO5 and to decide all disputes between players and clubs 100 not
involving salary 107 or discipline.'0 , Moreover, questions of player dis-
cipline, which initially may be brought to arbitration, later may be
appealed to the president for final determination.'0 " Finally, hockey's
tampering rule prohibits negotiations with a player only while he is
under contract to another team." 0
Baseball's Present Collective Bargaining Agreement
Despite baseball's exemption from the antitrust laws,"" the players'
union persuaded the league to adopt a collective bargaining agreement
in the early 1970's. The model for agreements in other sports, base-
ball's collective bargaining provisions permit aggrieved players and
clubs to bring their disputes before an arbitrator or arbitration panel
removed entirely from the baseball Commissioner's authority. '2 These
arbitration provisions have enabled baseball players to challenge suc-
cessfully the perpetual reserve clause and to gain a mobility similar to
that achieved by players in other sports through the antitrust laws.
Baseball's collective bargaining agreement defines a grievance as
"a complaint which involves the interpretation of, or compliance with,
the provisions of... any agreement between a Player and a Club." 113
Complaints under this provision may be appealed to a three-member
arbitration panel whose decision "shall constitute full, final and com-
plete disposition," 114 unless the dispute involves the integrity of base-
ball. In the latter event, the Commissioner has sole jurisdiction.11
105. NHL Standard Player Contract 18, 20 (1974 Form).
106. Id. 18.
107. NHL Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 15, art. X.
108. Id. art. IV, § 01.
109. Id. art. IV, § 01(c).
110. NHL Standard Player Contract 10 (1974 Form). By-Laws of the
National Hockey League § 15.
111. See note 13 supra & accompanying text.
112. Basic Agreement, supra note 3, art. X. For similar arbitration provisions
in the other three major professional sports see Football Collective Bargaining
Agreement, supra note 3, art. IX; NHL Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra
note 15, art. IV; Basketball Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 3,
art. XV.
113. Basic Agreement, supra note 3, art. X § A.1(a) (1976).
114. Id. art. X, § B. On the arbitration panel, which consists of three mem-
bers, the players association and major league clubs each select one Arbiter. The
third member, the panel's chairman, is chosen by the other two members. Id. art.
X, § A.9.
115. Id. art. X, § A.1 (b).
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In 1974, James "Catfish" Hunter, a pitcher, filed a grievance peti-
tion with the league in a dispute with Charles Finley, owner of the
Oakland Athletics, over the method by which Hunter was to receive
his deferred compensation."" Hunter had alleged that Finley had
breached the contract,11 7 and the arbitrator concurred, declaring the
pitcher a free agent."" Notwithstanding its potentially limiting factual
situation,1 9 the Hunter arbitration was significant in establishing the
extent of remedial action that arbitrators could take.
The arbitration following the Hunter decision formally created the
free agent status in baseball. In 1974, pitcher Andy Messersmith
signed a one-year, $90,000 contract with the Los Angeles Dodgers.
When the parties disagreed on terms for the 1975 season, the club
invoked paragraph 10 (a) of the uniform players contract, which em-
powered it to renew Messersmith's contract unilaterally. Although
Messersmith continued to play throughout the 1975 season, he sub-
sequently alleged that further renewal was impossible. 120
In arbitration Messersmith argued that baseball's option clause was
not perpetual, as contended by the owners, and that he thus was a free
agent. 21 The owners subsequently brought an action in a federal dis-
trict court in Missouri seeking declaratory judgment and an injunc-
tion,'1 22 and following the parties' agreement to return to arbitration,
the court retained jurisdiction to review the panel's jurisdictional
decision.2 3 Thereafter, the arbitrator found that the panel had juris-
diction,12 4 and held that the renewal clause was effective for one year
116. Hunter Arbitration, supra note 1, at 14-16.
117. Id. at 13-14.
118. Id. at 37-39.
119. PROFESSIONAL SPORTS AND THE LAW, supra note 59, at 12.
120. In re Arbitration between National & American Leagues of Professional
Baseball Clubs (Los Angeles and Montreal Clubs) & Major League Baseball
Players Ass'n (John A. Messersmith and David A. McNally), Decision No. 29,
at 1-5 (Dec. 23, 1975) [hereinafter cited as Messersmith Arbitration]. McNally's
situation involved issues similar to those raised by Messersmith, except that
McNally retired before completing the 1975 season, his renewal year. For brevity,
this Note discusses only Messersmith's case.
121. Id. at 1-5.
122. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp. v. Major League Baseball Players
Ass'n, 532 F.2d 615, 618-19 (8th Cir. 1976).
123. Id. at 619.
124. Messersmith Arbitration, supra note 120, at 29-31. Article XV of the
Basic Agreement expressly provided that the agreement did not concern the
reserve system. Because the arbitration panel could arbitrate only complaints
pertaining to the interpretation of, or compliance with, any agreement between
the owners and the players, the owners contended that the reserve clause was
beyond the panel's jurisdiction. Id. at 7-9. Seitz, the panel's chairman, concluded
that the subject of the reserve system was excluded from the Basic Agreement
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only; if the parties failed to agree on terms during that year, the
player would become a free agent.125 On review, both the district court
and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the arbi-
trator's decision.' 26
Following the Messersmith arbitration, baseball players and club
owners sought to formulate in the collective bargaining agreement a
system through which free agents could market their services. The
resultant mechanism, the reentry draft, to be held each November,127
provides that a club's right to negotiate for free agents is determined
in inverse order of its league standing for the previous season. Al-
though as many as twelve clubs may draft negotiation rights for the
same player,1 28 each team may sign only a limited number of free
agents, the latter figure dependent both on the availability of these
athletes and on the number of players a particular club loses through
the free agency process. 129
Baseball's tampering rule under the collective bargaining agree-
ment prohibits a club from negotiating contract terms with another
team's players during the period extending from the season's conclu-
sion until three days before the free agent draft. The restriction,
however, does not preclude discussion of possible advantages accru-
ing from a player's signing with a particular team; moreover, it is
inapplicable to the free agent's current club.130 After a player changes
teams, the former employer automatically becomes entitled to receive
compensation in the form of a draft choice; 31 thus, the Commission-
er's authority to determine compensation has been withdrawn. Fi-
nally, although the agreement fails to address the Commissioner's
to protect the players association from becoming a party to an illegal practice if
the Supreme Court were to decide that baseball was subject to the antitrust
laws. Id. at 24-25. The chairman also noted, however, that the league actually
had incorporated into the agreement parts of the reserve system contained in
Rule 3 (g), Rule 4-A, and 10 (a) of the uniform player's contract. Id. at 19-20.
125. Id. at 62-63.
126. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp. v. Major League Baseball Players
Ass'n, 532 F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1976).
127. Basic Agreement, supra note 3, art. XVII, § C.(1) (a) (1976). Intended
to regulate the marketing of free agents, the reentry draft distributes among
baseball's twenty-six teams the right to negotiate with these athletes.
128. Id. art. XVII, § C.(1) (b)-(c).
129. Id. art. XVII, § C.(a).
130. Id. art. XVII, § C.(3) (a).
131. Id. art. XVII, § C. (2) (e). If a club signs as a free agent a player who
has entered into a contract after 1976, it must "compensate the athlete's former
team by assigning to it a draft choice in the Regular Phase of the next June
Major League Rule 4 Amateur Player Draft." Id.
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right to disapprove a player contract, it does enable veteran players
of five years to require contract assignment.
132
DELINEATING THE RIGHTS OF OWNERS IN THE
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ERA
Atlanta National League Baseball Club: The Issue
Baseball's collective bargaining agreement reflects the professional
athletes' struggle to achieve freedom from a league's restrictive prac-
tices, which have been enforced primarily by the Commissioner. One
of the first cases testing the Commissioner's authority under the new
collective bargaining agreement, however, arose in a dispute with a
club owner and focused on the extent to which the agreement protects
owners from the Commissioner's arbitrary exercise of discretion.
Atlanta National League Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn 1:33 involved the
Commissioner's disciplining of Atlanta Braves' owner Ted Turner for
violation of the collective bargaining agreement's tampering rule.
1 34
At the suggestion of both the players association and the club owners,
Commissioner Bowie Kuhn had issued detailed warnings stating that
the rule prohibited both direct and indirect contacts with free agents
prior to the season's termination.13-, The proscribed forms of indirect
contact included "public comments which would indicate an interest in
signing any ... player." 136
The contested tampering incident occurred in October, 1976: while
attending a cocktail party, Turner informed San Francisco Giants co-
owner Robert Lurie in the presence of several reporters that he would
pay any sum necessary to acquire Gary Matthews, a Giants outfielder
who had become a free agent. Several San Francisco newspapers re-
ported Turner's statement, and Lurie filed a tampering complaint with
Commissioner Kuhn.13 7
The Commissioner determined that a tampering violation had oc-
curred and that Turner's actions contravened the Major League
Agreement's best interests of baseball clause.1 38 Pursuant to the au-
132. Id. art. XVII, § D.(1)-(2). If the club fails to comply with an assignment
demand of a five-year veteran, the latter may become a free agent. Id.
133. 432 F. Supp. 1213 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
134. Id. at 1215-18. See Basic Agreement, supra note 3, art. XVII, § C.(3) (a).
For a discussion of baseball's tampering rule see text accompanying note 130
supra.
135. 432 F. Supp. at 1215-16.
136. Id. at 1216 (letter from Kuhn issued to club owners on Sept. 28, 1976).
137. Id. at 1217.
138. Id. See note 37 supra & accompanying text.
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thority conferred on him by this provision, Kuhn suspended Turner
for one year and eliminated Atlanta's first-round draft choice in the
June amateur free agent draft.13 9 Turner thereupon filed suit in a
federal district court, alleging that the Commissioner lacked power
either to issue directives clarifying the tampering rule or to impose
the instant disciplinary sanctions.140 Citing a provision in the col-
lective bargaining agreement that provided for arbitration of dis-
putes over the agreement's terms, Turner maintained that the Commis-
sioner lacked jurisdiction to resolve interpretive questions pertaining
to the tampering rule because it was contained in the agreement.1 4 1
Examining the jurisdictional question of whether Turner had
waived his right of recourse to the judiciary, the court, in effect,
framed Atlanta National League's central issue. The Major League
Agreement stipulates that, in agreeing to be bound by decisions of the
Commissioner, clubs "severally waive such right of recourse to the
courts as would otherwise have existed in their favor." 142 Notwith-
standing this clause, the court relied on Charles 0. Finley & Co. v.
Kuhn 143 to hold that jurisdiction did exist, primarily because a con-
trary conclusion could have empowered the Commissioner to resolve
any baseball issue, "no matter how unauthorized or arbitrary that
decision might be." 144
The court concluded that the appropriate scope of review was
analogous to that exercised by courts when examining arbitration
decisions. 1 45 In such instances a court does not consider the case's
merits but, rather, confines its inquiry to four narrow questions:
whether the arbitrator's decision was procured by fraud; whether the
decision was unduly biased; whether the arbitrator was guilty of mis-
conduct during the hearings; and whether the arbitrator exceeded his
authority.'4 6 Negative responses to any of these questions preclude a
court from setting aside the decision, notwithstanding its disagree-
ment with the arbitrator on the merits of the case.147 Noting that "this
139. 432 F. Supp. at 1217.
140. Id. at 1218.
141. Id. at 1218, 1221.
142. Major League Agreement, art. VII, § 2 (1970). For the text of § 2 see note
38 supra.
143. Cause No. 76C2358 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 7, 1976).
144. 432 F. Supp. at 1218 (quoting Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, Cause No.
76C2358, slip. op. at 3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 7, 1976)).
145. See e.g., United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 336 U.S.
593 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574(1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
146. 9 U.S.C.A. §§ 10(a)-(d) (1970) ; 432 F. Supp. at 1218.
147. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,
597-98 (1960).
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court's decision on the merits is one that could be reached despite
the limited judicial review of arbitration decisions," 148 the district
court sought to determine whether the baseball Commissioner had ex-
ceeded his authority under the best interests of baseball clause and
whether he had intervened illegally in procedures established by the
collective bargaining agreement for resolution of disputes involving
the agreement's luerms. 14 9
Impairment of the Arbitration Right
Atlanta National League focused on conflicting provisions within
the Major League and collective bargaining agreements. As noted,
baseball's collective bargaining agreement defines "grievance" as any
complaint involving "interpretation of, or compliance with, . . . any
agreement between the Association and the Clubs or any of them,
or any agreement between a player and a Club."'150 Inasmuch as
Turner's dispute with the Commissioner concerned compliance with
the tampering rule, a provision within the collective bargaining agree-
ment, it apparently fell within the definition of a grievance and there-
fore should have been subject to the exclusive remedy of arbitration.' 51
Commissioner Kuhn, however, disagreed, claiming that he held juris-
diction over the dispute by virtue of the Major League Agreement's
best interests of baseball clause. 52 Under Kuhn's interpretation of
this clause, only he could determine whether a tampering violation
actually had occurred.
Because the Major League Agreement antedated the free agent
draft, the court initially sought to determine the extent of the Agree-
ment's applicability to the novel free agent tampering question. 53 The
existence of a subsequent contract, the collective bargaining agree-
ment, complicated the court's decision. This contract, "complete within
itself," had been negotiated by the players and owners to control the
148. 432 F. Supp. at 1219.
149. Id. at 1219-20.
150. Basic Agreement, supra note 3, art. X, § A.(1) (a). See text accompanying
note 113 supra. Section 1(b), which states that "'[g]rievance' shall not mean a
complaint which involves action taken with respect to a Player or Players by the
Commissioner involving the preservation of the integrity of . . . the game of
baseball . . . ," was inapplicable in Atlanta National League because the dispute
involved an owner. Id. art. X, § A.(1) (b) (emphasis supplied).
151. Id. art. X, § A.(1) (a). According to the Basic Agreement, arbitration by
a tripartite panel is the exclusive remedy for a grievance. Id. art. X, § B.
152. 432 F. Supp. at 1217. For the text of the best interests of baseball clause
see note 37 supra.




free agent situation.155 Deciding that the two agreements should be
read together, however, the court held that the Commissioner's powers
under the Major League Agreement had been modified "only so as to
avoid infringing upon the rights secured by the parties to the collec-
tive bargaining agreement." ' 15 Stating further that "It]he clear
intent of the arbitration provision and the Collective Bargaining
Agreement in general was to settle disputes between player and club,
not club and club, or club and Commissioner, as was the case here,"'1'
the court concluded that Kuhn had authority under the Major League
Agreement's "best interests" of baseball clause to determine that
Turner had violated the tampering rule.15s
In seeking to discern the intent behind baseball's governing pro-
visions, the court in Atlanta National League employed a recognized
rule of statutory interpretation. 59 Nevertheless, in its assumption
that resort to arbitration was limited to disputes between players and
clubs, the court misconstrued the objective of the collective bargaining
agreement. Although its main purpose is to alleviate the historic
inequality between players and club owners, the agreement also pro-
vides for resolution of future disputes over the status of players as
free agents. 60 That the conflict is between the Commissioner and
an owner is irrelevant, if it was a consequence of a free agency ques-
tion. The district court's narrow reading of the arbitration clause,
therefore, limits the agreement's application in an area it was in-
tended to govern.
The court's restrictive interpretation also caused it to overlook a
significant connection between the Major League and collective
bargaining agreements. Although it concluded that the Commis-
sioner's powers under the Major League Agreement had been modified
to prevent his unnecessary infringement of the rights of the parties to
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1221.
158. Id.
159. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Bilder, 369 U.S. 499 (1962); Mastro Plastics
Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956); Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v.
Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U.S. 315 (1938).
160. The collective bargaining agreement:
provides for the creation of free agencies upon the expiration of
player contracts (Art. XVII, B); spells out reentry procedures
(Art. XVII, C); forbids clubs from contracting or negotiating
terms with free agents in the interim between the end of the
season and the reentry draft (Art. XVII, C. (2)); and provides
for three-party arbitration "as the exclusive remedy of the
parties." (Art. X, prelim. par.)
432 F. Supp. at 1220.
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the collective bargaining agreement,"" the court failed to consider that
the latter agreement was signed both by players and club owners. Be-
cause the owners also are "parties" to the agreement, they are en-
titled to the same rights of arbitration as are the players.
Although the court in Atlanta National League purported to decide
the case according to the rules of statutory construction, it failed to
apply one fundamental canon: conflicting statutes should be construed
in harmony with each other.1 2 If harmonization proves impossible,
then the specific provision should govern the general, 1"' although the
latter is sufficiently broad to include the subject in question.164 The
best interest of baseball clause of the Major League Agreement, clearly
a general provision, empowers the Commissioner to impose discipli-
nary sanctions for a potentially limitless variety of activities. For
example, he may suspend a player for a criminal conviction, prohibit
an athlete from frequenting disreputable nightclubs, or discipline a
team member for violent conduct during a contest.1 5 No specific pro-
hibitions are enumerated; the Commissioner alone determines what
actions are not within baseball's best interests. The arbitration pro-
vision is narrower in scope, applying only to disputes over interpre-
tation of or compliance with the terms of the agreement. As an ex-
clusive remedy, it prevents the Commissioner's interference in areas
covered within its terms. The specific arbitration clause, conflicting
with the general best interests of baseball provision, therefore
should have governed the tampering question.
Although the court failed to apply this procedure for construing
conflicting statutes, it nevertheless adhered to the same canon' in
161. Id.
162. See, e.g., Aaron v. United States, 204 F. 943, 946-47 (8th Cir. 1913) ; Dis-
trict of Columbia v. Linda Pollin Memorial Housing Corp., 313 A. 2d 579, 583
(D.C. 1973).
163. See, e.g., Monte Vista Lodge v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 384
F.2d 126, 129 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 950 (1968); Bradford
Novelty Co. v. Manheim, 156 F. Supp. 489, 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); City of Cin-
cinnati v. Smallwood, 106 Ohio App. 496, -, 150 N.E.2d 310, 313 (1958).
164. See, e.g., Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 125 (1904) ; Townsend v.
Little, 109 U.S. 504, 512 (1883); General Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 324
F.2d 971, 974 (Ct. Cl. 1963); City of Tulsa v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 75
F.2d 343, 351 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 744 (1935).
165. See Weistart, supra note 38, at 703 nn. 3-4. Although the Commissioner
may have specific powers to discourage gambling and player violence, pre-
sumably he could use his authority arising from the best interests of baseball
clause to proscribe such activities. Pursuant to a similar clause, CONST. AND BY-
LAWS FOR THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE § 8.6 (1976), NFL Commissioner
Rozelle suspended Lance Rentzel, a wide receiver for the Dallas Cowboys, follow-
ing his conviction for indecent exposure and an arrest for drug possession. See
Weistart, supra note 38, at 733 n. 99.
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determining the sanctions the Commissioner could impose for a
tampering violation. Noting first that the best interests of baseball
clause empowers the Commissioner to take "preventive, remedial, or
punitive action," 16G the court decided that the disciplining of Turner
had been punitive rather than remedial 167 in nature because "the only
party which may have been injured, the San Francisco club, received
no relief at all." "I" The Commissioner's authority to penalize, how-
ever, derives from only three provisions in the Major League Agree-
ment. Article one, section 2(a) authorizes the Commissioner to im-
pose "penalties as hereinafter provided;" ",9 the next provision, sec-
tion 3, enumerates specific punitive measures, ranging from repri-
mand to suspension.'7 0 Finally, under Major League Rule 50, the
Commissioner may discipline a club that violates any Rules "as to
which penalty provisions are not otherwise set forth in the Major
League Agreement or Major League Rules" by imposing a fine or
suspending for thirty days the benefit of the Rules as to any club.17'
Rejecting the Commissioner's argument that the section 3 list of
penalties merely illustrated the types of sanctions he could impose,' -7 2
the court held that the sole punitive sanctions available to the Com-
missioner were those appearing in that section or in a Major League
Rule. 17 3 Because suspension is listed specifically in section 3, the
court accordingly upheld Kuhn's suspension of Turner. 74 That section,
however, made no provision for draft choice denial; consequently,
the court invalidated the Commissioner's elimination of Atlanta's first
round amateur draft choice. 75 In effect, the court employed the rule of
statutory construction it previously had overlooked: that the specific
provisions of section 3 and Rule 50 governed the more general clause
in section 2(a).
166. 432 F. Supp. at 1223 (quoting Major League Agreement art. I, § 2(b)
(1975)).
167. 432 F. Supp. at 1226.
168. Id. at 1225.
169. Id. at 1225 (quoting Major League Agreement art. I, § 2(a) (1975)).
170. 432 F. Supp. at 1223. The enumeration, however, does not include denial
of a draft choice.
171. Id. at 1225 (quoting Major League Rule 50).
172. 432 F. Supp. at 1223-24.
173. Id. at 1223-26. After the Turner incident, the owners "voted unanimously
to permit Kuhn to take away a draft choice or levy a fine of up to $250,000, or
both, against a club for tampering with a player belonging to another team."
Wash. Post, Aug. 18, 1977, at G2, col. 5.
174. 432 F. Supp. at 1223.
175. Id. at 1223-26.
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The Collective Bargaining Agreement as a Shield for Owners
Noting that Kuhn's supplemental tampering directives were con-
sistent with and designed to effectuate the collective bargaining agree-
ment, the court in Atlanta National League rejected Turner's conten-
tion that the Commissioner lacked authority to issue the orders.176 The
court thereby avoided the issue of whether Kuhn's authority to sus-
pend Turner would exist "even if an indirect contact rule was incon-
sistent with the Collective Bargaining tampering rule, so long as the
rights of the players were not thereby infringed." 177 By referring
only to the rights of the players and not to those of the owners, the
Commissioner, like the court, failed to recognize that both parties
have signed the agreement and as signatories have rights and duties
arising from it.
The Commissioner has a vital interest in ensuring that club owners
attempting to sign quality players conform to the tampering rule.
Nevertheless, his interest in compliance necessitates no subordination
of the owners' arbitration rights under the collective bargaining agree-
ment. The process of requiring an arbitration panel to make the initial
determination of whether a tampering violation has occurred and then
permitting the Commissioner to impose a sanction not only would
preserve baseball's integrity, but also would protect the value of the
free agent structure. Moreover, this procedure would help to relieve
players and owners from the Commissioner's arbitrary decisions of
what constitutes the best interests of baseball.
Judicial reluctance to disturb decisions by sports commissioners, as
evidenced by Atlanta National League,178 derives in part from the
notion that, by vesting in the commissioner authority to resolve dis-
putes, parties have waived their rights to question his decisions. This
view fails to recognize the effect of recent developments, such as the
free agent draft, on professional sports and the role of commissioners.
Collective bargaining agreements that contain arbitration provisions
similar to the one construed in Atlanta National League are designed
to resolve disputes arising from these new practices, without the
commissioner's interference. In permitting Kuhn to circumvent the
arbitration provision through the best interests of baseball clause, the
176. Id. at 1221-22. The court emphasized that one of Kuhn's letters recited
language identical to that used in the collective bargaining agreement and that
the Commissioner's directives were approved by the Executive Council and the
Player Relations Committee. Id. at 1221.
177. Id. at 1221 (emphasis supplied).
178. See also Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, Cause No. 76C2358 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 7, 1976) ; Milwaukee Am. Ass'n v. Landis, 49 F.2d 298 (N.D. Ill. 1931).
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district court invited further intervention by sports commissioners
in other, more established collective bargaining subject areas, such
as those involving the reserve system and the assignment of player
contracts. Contractual agreements between players and clubs con-
cerning league operation should be interpreted in the context of the
contemporary sports structure and should not be required to conform
to obsolete practices.
THE OWNER'S ANTITRUST DEFENSE TO COMMISSIONER ACTION
In Atlanta National League, the club owner based his defense
against Commissioner Kuhn's disciplinary actions on the collective
bargaining agreement, the contract that had been negotiated following
the players' effective challenges to restrictive league practices. In
Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn,1'7 9 however, the club owner invoked
the antitrust laws, which earlier had formed the basis for many suc-
cessful player-suits in other sports, to attack Kuhn's actions.
Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn: Background and Decision
In Finley the owner of the Oakland Athletics, Charles Finley, chal-
lenged the Commissioner's invalidation of a 1976 mid-season sale of
three players. s0 One of the three, Vida Blue, had signed a 1976 con-
tract with Oakland; the other two players, Joe Rudi and Rollie
Fingers, were completing their option years, having played for the
Athletics during 1976 without signing contracts for that season.181
Under the new rules governing free agents, Finley's failure to nego-
tiate new contracts with Rudi and Fingers before the 1976 season's
conclusion would have permitted both players to sign with other
clubs. To avoid the uncompensated loss of these athletes in the free
agent draft, Finley entered into contracts on the day before the Major
League trading deadline, 82 selling Blue to the New York Yankees
for $1,500,000 and Rudi and Fingers to the Boston Red Sox for
$2,000,000.183 Within a week of the transaction, however, Commis-
sioner Kuhn conducted a hearing, concluded that the contract assign-
179. Cause No. 76C2358 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 7, 1976) (memorandum opinion and
order on defendant's motion for summary judgment).
180. Id. at 1-2.
181. Id. at 1.
182. Major League Rule 10(a) (1) (A). According to this rule, a team may
assign a player's contract to another club within the same league "[i]n the
period starting at midnight the last day of the championship season and ending
at midnight the following June 15, without waivers." Id.
183. Cause No. 76C2358, slip op. at 1-2.
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ments were void, and ordered the players to remain with Oakland.
Finley in turn brought suit in federal district court. 4
Whether the Commissioner is authorized to prevent such player
sales is a question of particular significance in the free agent era of
professional sports. The development of a player's skills frequently
requires a large monetary investment by the club owner; under the
free agent system, however, investment return might be denied when
the player changes teams. Consequently, Finley's attempt to sell his
players prior to their acquisition of free agent status apparently rep-
resents sound business judgment.185
The district court refused to resolve the issues raised in Finley in a
motion by the defendant for summary judgment; 186 instead, it deemed
necessary a full trial on the merits of Kuhn's contention that his au-
thority pursuant to the best interests of baseball clause and his player
contract approval power in Rule 12 (a) authorized him to void the
proposed assignments.1 7 Noting that Kuhn's approval powers might
extend only to the formalities of transfer rather than to the sub-
stantive aspects of a contract assignment,' 8 the court stated that a
184. Id. at 2.
185. This situation also could occur in other sports. For example, a more active
free agent market will develop in basketball when the NBA compensation rule
expires at the conclusion of the 1980-81 season. See note 99 supra & accompany-
ing text.
186. Cause No. 76C2358, slip op. at 3-4.
187. Id. Major League Rule 12(a) states:
REQUImMENTS. The Professional Baseball Executive Council shall
prescribe the form of Assignments and of the Optional Agree-
ments between Major League Clubs and National Association
Clubs and no such transaction shall be recognized as valid unless
within fifteen (15) days after execution a counterpart original
of the document shall be filed with the Secretary-Treasurer of the
Executive Council and approved by the Commissioner.
(emphasis supplied).
188. Cause No. 76C2358, slip op. at 4-6. In a hearing on the merits, the court
later concluded that the Commissioner's powers covered substantive matters and
that he had authority deriving from the best interest of baseball clause and
Rule 12(a) to disapprove Finley's sales. Moreover, the court observed that on
several occasions Kuhn had "taken broad preventive or remedial action with
respect to assignments of player contracts." Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn,
Cause No. 76C2358, slip op. at 12 (N.D. Ill. March 17, 1977). In 1969, for
example, Kuhn ordered the consummation of a trade between the Houston Astros
and the Montreal Expos, although the transaction was invalid under Major
League Rule 12(f). After Montreal traded Donn Clendenon and Jesus Alou for
Houston's Rusty Staub, Clendenon retired from baseball. Normally the exchange
would have been proscribed by Rule 12(f), which renders void the assignment
of a contract if a traded player refuses to report to his new club. Nevertheless,
after noting the Montreal fans' keen interest in acquiring Staub, the Commis-
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full hearing also was required to determine whether the Commis-
sioner's decision had been arbitrary. 8 9
Kuhn was successful in securing dismissal of Finley's allegation of
deprivation of the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal
protection.' 0 Finley maintained that the requisite state action for
such claims "' was satisfied not only by some Major League teams'
use of state-owned facilities but also by baseball's exemption from
antitrust liability.' 92 Unpersuaded, the court held that the complaint
failed to allege specific involvement by the state in the Commissioner's
decision. 19 3 Moreover, it emphasized that no activities by a private
party, such as Commissioner Kuhn, could constitute state action unless
a nexus existed between the state and the challenged activity: '04 "the
sioner "acting in what he described as 'the best interest of baseball' ordered
that the assignments of Staub to Montreal and Alou to Hounston be consum-
mated, and that Montreal assign suitable players to Houston to replace Clen-
denon." Id. at 13.
In the same year, Kuhn also intervened in an assignment between the Cleve-
land Indians and the Boston Red Sox. After Ken Harrelson, one of the six
traded players, announced that he would not report to Cleveland, the Commis-
sioner suspended the entire transaction until Harrelson could be convinced that
his interests would be served by reporting to Cleveland. Id. at 13-14. The court
also noted that 21 of the 25 clubs that were parties to the present Major League
Agreement recognized the Commissioner's authority to intervene in an assignment
of a player contract not in the best interests of baseball. Id. at 16-17.
The court identified several reasons supporting the Commissioner's power to
review the assignment of player contracts. Through the process of review, the
Commissioner can maintain an awareness of where in the league the actual
players are located. In addition, the court determined that "[a]mong the reasons
for this procedure is the clear intention to allow the Commissioner to review
and exercise his broad authority over player assignments before they become
final. Though the approval of most assignments is perfunctory, it is not a mere
ministerial function." Id. at 18.
189. Cause No. 76C2358, slip op. at 6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 7, 1976). After a full
hearing on this matter, the court held that although Kuhn's actions were drastic,
they were neither arbitrary nor capricious. Cause No. 76C2358, slip op. at 25
(N.D. Ill. March 17, 1977). Despite prior cash sales of other player contracts,
"'these transactions were unparalleled in the history of the game' because there
was 'never anything on this scale or falling at this time of the year, or which
threatened so seriously to unbalance the competitive balance of baseball.'" Id. at
22.
190. Cause No. 76C2358, slip op. at 7-8 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 7, 1976).
191. See, e.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 171-179 (1972);
Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 445 (1970); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13
(1948). The state action requirement has been a principle of constitutional law
since the Supreme Court's decision in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
192. Cause No. 76C2358, slip op. at 7.
193. Id. at 8.
194. Id. The court's emphasis was based on the Supreme Court's holding in
Jackson v. Metropoliton Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
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state must affirmatively support and be directly involved in the
specific conduct which is being challenged." 195 These requirements
probably will foreclose club owners from successfully asserting con-
stitutional violations by league commissioners.
Finally, baseball's exemption from the antitrust laws led the court
to dismiss Finley's charge that invalidation of the contract assign-
ments constituted a violation of the Sherman Act.196 In other major
professional sports, which do not enjoy this exemption, however, 197 the
courts might view favorably an antitrust argument. Indeed, the cur-
rent free agent status of football, basketball, and hockey players
renders the recurrence of such disputes between owner and com-
missioner inevitable, and a defense based on the Sherman Act could
succeed.
Possible Alternatives: Nonstatutory Defenses
If an owner's antitrust challenge proves unsuccessful in football,
basketball or hockey disputes, as well as unavailable in baseball con-
flicts, several other possible grounds remain for challenging the Com-
missioner's authority to prevent assignments of player contracts.
Initially, the owner might allege intentional interference by the Com-
missioner with existizg contractual relations. A recognized tortious
action, 19 such interference is unlawful unless the party charged can
prove that his conduct was justified or privileged. 9 9 If the owner
succeeds in demonstrating that the professional league's governing
doctrines do not empower the commissioner to void player contract as-
signments and that the commissioner thus had acted in excess of his
195. Cause No. 76C2358, slip op. at 8. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S.
163, 176-77 (1972).
196. Cause No. 76C2358, slip op. at 8. See note 13 supra & accompanying text.
197. See note 13 supra & accompanying text.
198. The tort of intentional interference with contractual relations emerged
in the English case of Lumley v. Gye, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (1853), and now is
recognized in most jurisdictions of the United States. See, e.g., Knickerbocker
Ice Co. v. Gardiner. Dairy Co., 107 Md. 556, 69 A. 405 (1908); Sorenson v.
Chevrolet Motor Co., 171 Minn. 260, 214 N.W. 754 (1927) ; Louis Kamm, Inc. v.
Flink, 113 N.J.L. 582, 175 A. 62 (1934); Keviczky v. Lorber, 290 N.Y. 297, 49
N.E.2d 146 (1943).
199. See, e.g., Connors v. Connally, 86 Conn. 641, 86 A. 600 (1913); DeMinico
v. Craig, 207 Mass. 593, 94 N.E. 317 (1911). Cf. Bentley v. Teton, 19 Ill. App. 2d
284, 153 N.E.2d 495 (1958) (government workers reporting to his supervisor on
nurse's behavior); Caverno v. Fellows, 300 Mass. 331, 15 N.E.2d 483 (1938)
(high school officials reporting teacher's conduct).
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contractual authority, 200 the owner would be entitled both to damages
and injunctive relief.20 1
Alternatively, an aggrieved owner might argue that, although
restraints of trade in a commissioner's contract may not constitute
antitrust violations, they nonetheless are void as against public
policy.20 2 Inasmuch as the courts determine a restraint's legality by
reference to its reasonableness in a particular situation,203 a public
policy defense would require that the owner prove unreasonable a
contract empowering the commissioner to prevent player sales. Suc-
cess in proving such an illegal restraint would depend on the nature
and persuasiveness of the evidence presented.
The Antitrust Argument: Overcoming the Single Entity Doctrine
Judicial classification of a sports league and its member clubs as a
joint venture frequently has prevented club owners from invoking
the antitrust laws to attack restrictive league practices.20 4 Because
200. Atlanta Nat'l League Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 432 F. Supp. 1213, 1226
(N.D. Ga. 1977). Owner Ted Turner, who presented this argument to the court,
was partially successful. His suspension was determined to be within the con-
tractual authority conferred on the Commissioner by the leagues; nevertheless, in
denying Turner a draft choice, the Commissioner had acted ultra vires. The
court concluded, however, that Turner had suffered no injury because the draft
had not yet been held, and thus awarded the owner no damages. Id.
Before the conclusion of Finley's suit against Kuhn, the major league clubs
voted to indemnify Kuhn both for his litigation expenses and for his potential
liability to Finley resulting from the legal contest. Charles 0. Finley & Co. v.
Kuhn, Cause No. 76C2358, slip op. at 22 (N.D. Ill. March 17, 1977). This vote
"implemented a standing resolution of the Major League clubs,... which specifies
that the Commissioner may be indemnified only if the clubs determine that he
'acted in good faith in any manner he reasonably believed to be in and not op-
posed to the best interests of the Major Leagues.'" Id. at 23.
201. Atlanta Nat'l League Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 432 F. Supp. 1213,
1226 (N.D. Ga. 1977). For decisions on the computation of damages see McNutt
Oil & Refining Co. v. D'Ascoli, 79 Ariz. 28, 281 P.2d 966 (1955); Kerr v. DuPree,
35 Ga. App. 122, 132 S.E. 393 (1926); Anderson v. Moskovitz, 260 Mass. 523,
157 N.E. 601 (1927).
202. Contracts void as against public policy include those containing covenants
not to compete that extend beyond limits reasonably necessary to protect the
relevant interests. See, e.g., Interstate Finance Corp. v. Wood, 69 F. Supp. 278,
279 (E.D. Ill. 1946) ; Borden, Inc. v. Smith, 252 Ark. 295, -, 478 S.W.2d 744, 747
(1972); Worley & Assocs., Inc. v. Bull, 233 Ga. 276, -, 210 S.E.2d 807, 808
(1974).
203. Most courts have adopted this approach. See, e.g., Scapa Dryers, Inc. v.
Abney Mills, 269 F.2d 6, 11-12 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 901 (1959) ; Cali
v. National Linen Serv. Corp., 38 F.2d 35, 37 (5th Cir. 1930); Griffin v. Okla-
homa Natural Gas Corp., 37 F.2d 545, 548 (10th Cir. 1930).
204. Levin v. National Basketball Ass'n, 385 F. Supp. 149 (S.D.N.Y. 1974);
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no violation of the Sherman Act will be found unless "at least two
independent business entities accused of combining or conspiring to
restrain trade," exist, -°.5 the characterization of a league as a "single
entity" precludes antitrust challenges.
2 °
In 1974, for example, a California federal district court applied the
single entity doctrine to an action brought by the owner of the San
Francisco Seals hockey team. At issue in San Francisco Seals, Ltd. v.
National Hockey League 207 was a provision in the NHL constitution,
designed to protect league teams from economic competition with one
another, that granted to each team a home territory and certain ex-
clusive rights.2 08 When the NHL Board of Governors denied his re-
San Francisco Seals, Ltd. v. National Hockey League, 379 F. Supp. 966 (C.D.
Cal. 1974); American Football League v. National Football League, 205 F. Supp.
60 (D. Md. 1962), aff'd, 323 F.2d 124 (4th Cir. 1963); United States v. National
Football League, 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953). In American Football League,
the AFL, while attempting to establish itself as a new league, charged the NFL
with violations of §§ 1, 2, and 3 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1970).
The case exemplifies a judicial recognition of leagues as complete and separate
entities competing with one another. Moreover, in discussing the league's choice
of location for a new member club, the court compared a football league's opera-
tion to that of a chain store. 323 F.2d at 130.
Other cases that have treated the league and its member clubs as a joint ven-
ture involved services of process or venue requirements for antitrust actions. See
Erving v. Virginia Squires Baskeball Club, 349 F. Supp. 709 (E.D.N.Y. 1972)
(service of process); Hawkins v. National Basketball Ass'n, 288 F. Supp. 614
(W.D. Pa. 1968) (venue requirements).
205. San Francisco Seals, Ltd. v. National Hockey League, 379 F. Supp. 966,
969 (C.D. Cal. 1974); see, e.g., Six Twenty-Nine Prods., Inc. v. Rollins Tele-
casting, Inc., 365 F.2d 478, 484 (5th Cir. 1966) ; Stewart v. Hevelone, 283 F.
Supp. 842, 845 (D. Neb. 1968).
206. Levin v. National Basketball Ass'n, 385 F. Supp. 149 (S.D.N.Y. 1974);
San Francisvo Seals, Ltd. v. National Hockey League, 379 F. Supp. 966 (C.D. Cal.
1974). In Levin a prospective owner of the Boston Celtics brought suit after the
NBA's Board of Governors rejected his application to buy the franchise. The
court declared that although the teams compete athletically, they are engaged
economically in a joint venture. 385 F. Supp. at 150. Consequently, the applicant
wanted not to compete with those unwilling to accept him, "but to be partners in
the operation of a sports league for plaintiffs' profit." Id. at 152. The court re-
jected the applicability of the Sherman Act in this situation, repudiating the
plaintiff's claims. Id. at 152-53.
207. 379 F. Supp. 966 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
208. Id. at 967-68. Section 4.2 of the NHL Constitution provides:
The League shall have exclusive control of the playing of hockey
games by member clubs in the home territory of each member,
subject to the rights hereinafter granted to members. The members
shall have the right to and agree to operate professional hockey
clubs and play the League schedule in their respective cities or
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quest to move the franchise from San Francisco to Vancouver,'2 0 ' the
Seals' owner brought a private antitrust action against the NHL and
all members of the league, alleging a violation of section 1 of the Sher-
man Act.210
Before determining the applicability of the single entity doctrine,
the court must define the relevant market 211 and decide whether com-
merce within that market is affected by the alleged restraint.212 In San
Francisco Seals, the territorial market included both Canada and the
United States; the product market constituted the presentation of
professional hockey matches to live audiences.213 According to the
court, because the plaintiff owner desired to participate in this mar-
ket as a member of the league and therefore to enjoy the league's
anticompetitive territorial rights, he did not compete economically
with the defendants. 214 Teams within the league were "acting to-
boroughs as indicated opposite their signatures hereto. No member
shall transfer its club and franchise to a different city or borough.
No additional cities or boroughs shall be added to the League
circuit without the consent of three-fourths of all the members of
the League. Any admission of new members with franchises to
operate in any additional cities or boroughs shall be subject to the
provisions of Section 4.3.
CONST. OF NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE § 4.2 (1947, amended 1975). Section 4.3,
which refers to the territorial rights of the member clubs, states in pertinent
part:
Each member shall have exclusive control of the playing of hockey
games within its home territory including, but not being limited
to, the playing in such home territory of hockey games by any
team owned or controlled by such member or by other members of
the League .... No franchise shall be granted for a home territory
within the home territory of a member, without the written consent
of such member.
Id. § 4.3.
209. 379 F. Supp. at 968.
210. Id. at 967-68. Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides that "[e]very con-
tract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). Section 2 of the Act prevents the
monopolization of "any part of the trade or commerce among the several states."
Id. § 2.
211. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); United
States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956) ; Karlinsky v. New
York Racing Ass'n, 517 F.2d 1010 (2d Cir. 1975); Trwin City Sportservice, Inc.
v. Charles 0. Finley & Co., 512 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1975); American Aloe Corp.
v. Aloe Creme Laboratories, Inc., 420 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1970); Mercantile
Nat'l Bank v. Quest, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 926 (N.D. Ind. 1969).
212. 379 F. Supp. at 968.
213. Id. at 969.
214. Id. The court's distinction of United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596
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gether as one single business enterprise, competing against other
similarly organized professional leagues." 215 Categorization as a
member of the entity he was suing 216 thus precluded the owner of the
San Francisco Seals from presenting his antitrust challenge to the
league's practice: only a competing hockey league could assert such
a claim.
217
Inasmuch as the success of an antitrust action usually is contingent
on the court's delineation of the relevant market, litigants frequently
criticize such judicial determinations as either too broad or too nar-
(1972) was unconvincing. In Topco the United States sought an injunction
against Topco, a cooperative association of 25 regional supermarket chains that
granted exclusive territorial licenses to its members. The association's by-laws
prohibited the supermarkets from selling products outside specified areas. More-
over, membership in Topco could be enlarged only by a three-fourths vote of the
existing members. 405 U.S. at 597-603. Relying on its prior holding in United
States v. Sealy, Inc.. 388 U.S. 350 (1967), the Supreme Court declared Topco's
arrangement to be a horizontal territorial restraint, a per se violation of the
antitrust laws. In Topco, Justice Marshall stated that Sealy:
is, in fact, on all fours with this case. Sealy licensed manufac-
turers of mattresses and bedding to make and sell products using
the Sealy trademark .... Just as in this case, Sealy agreed with
the licensees not to license other manufacturers or sellers to sell
Sealy-brand products in a designated territory in exchange for the
promise of the licensee who sold in that territory not to expand its
sales beyond the area demarcated by Sealy. The Court held that
this was a horizontal territorial restraint, which was per se viola-
tive of the Sherman Act.
405 U.S. at 609.
The agreements in Topco and Sealy, including the territorial restrictions, were
identical to those in the NHL constitution. The district court in San Francisco
Seals nevertheless determined that Topco was inapplicable because it involved
"combinations of independent business enterprises competing economically with
each other." 379 F. Supp. at 970. If the hockey teams were not competitors,
however, they would need no territorial restrictions. Yet, in practice, these rights
are a prime consideration in deciding whether a team may move to another city
or whether a new club shall be admitted to the league. The court's logic in
arriving at the conclusion that the clubs are a single entity rather than economic
competitors therefore is inconsistent.
215. 379 F. Supp. at 969.
216. Id. at 969-71.
217. Id. at 972. Section 4 of the Clayton Act states that "[any person who
shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in
the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States."
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970). The courts have interpreted this section as providing
standing to sue only to those injured persons who are within the target area of
the statute. 379 F. Supp. at 971-72. The target area has been defined as "that
area of the economy which is endangered by a breakdown of competitive condi-
tions in a particular industry. Otherwise he is not injured 'by reason' of any-
thing forbidden in the antitrust laws." Id. at 972 (quoting Conference of Studio
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row. 218 The court's market definition in San Francisco Seals was sus-
pect in its breadth, failing to account for factors in the structure of
professional sports that force a league's member teams to compete
economically. Because a home team shares its gate receipts with the
visiting club, the economic health of each team is crucial to every
league member. Nevertheless, competition for player contracts re-
mains. Able to lure better players and thus to develop winning teams,
wealthy clubs ultimately profit from increased gate receipts. Con-
versely, poorer teams that cannot afford high-priced athletes more
often are unsuccessful in athletic competition and consequently fail to
attract large audiences. The resulting decreased gate receipts in turn
render more difficult the club's efforts to attract skilled players, and
the cycle repeats itself.
Economic competition between club owners thus has a major impact
on three areas of sports operation: free agent bidding, player salary
payment, and team promotion. This competition has been evidenced
through the ability of athletes to complete their option years and to
obtain higher salaries as free agents. In addition, the general increases
in athletes' saalries are indicative of club owners' efforts to prevent
their players from seeking a free agent status.21'1 If the court in San
Francisco Seals had recognized these factors, the single entity doc-
trine would have been inapplicable, for this intraleague competition
should require that the relevant product market be defined as the
offering of personal services by individual players.
Focusing on the athletes individually, rather than the collective
product of the league, this narrower definition dispenses with the
single entity doctrine and mandates a judicial determination of
whether the challenged league practice actually violates the antitrust
laws. In disputes involving the commissioner's disapproval of a con-
tract for the sale or assignment of a player, the aggrieved club owner
Unions v. Loew's Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 55 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919
(1952)). The district court concluded that, in this instance, the sole area the
antitrust laws were meant to protect was that in which a rival hockey league
competed. Thus, only a rival hockey league would have had standing to sue. 379
F. Supp. at 972. Cf. American Football League v. National Football League, 205
F. Supp. 60 (D. Md. 1962), aff'd, 323 F.2d 124 (4th Cir. 1963) (involving pro-
fessional football leagues).
218. Other attempts by the judiciary to define the relevant market in cases
related to the subject of professional sports have been questionable. See, e.g.,
Karlinsky v. New York Racing Ass'n, 517 F.2d 1010 (2d Cir. 1975); Twin City
Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles 0. Finley & Co., 512 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1975).
219. That a competitive market for player services exists also is suggested by
the efforts to sign free agents by teams such as the New York Yankees, the
Boston Red Sox, the San Diego Padres, the California Angels, and the Texas
Rangers.
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might allege that, in sanctioning the decision, other teams had con-
spired in a refusal to deal. Such action may be construed as a group
boycott, a per se violation of the Sherman Act,22 0 operating to restrain
the owner from competition in the relevant market. If the court deems
the per se rule inapplicable in the context of professional sports, the
owner might establish abridgement of the Sherman Act under the rule
of reason test. 21 Ultimately, the success of antitrust litigation
initiated by owners would benefit professional sports as a whole, by
permitting clubs throughout a league to compete more freely for
skilled players. Accompanying this increased competition would be a
commensurate increase in the market value of the players' services.
CONCLUSION
In recent years, the structure of professional sports has altered
significantly. By challenging restrictive league practices, athletes have
attained collective bargaining rights and, in the process, have rede-
fined their relationship with the league and its representative, the
commissioner. One result of this litigation, the creation of a free agent
market for players, may force the commissioner to contend with a
new group of antagonists, club owners.
In baseball, clashes already have occurred between aggressive
owners, who are actively competing for quality players, and the Com-
missioner, who is seeking to ensure that such competition neither
disrupts baseball's order nor destroys the sport's integrity. Notwith-
standing their results, both Finley and Atlanta National League sug-
gest that, through the antitrust laws and collective bargaining agree-
ments, club owners possess a means of successfully challenging
arbitrary decisions by the Commissioner. Inasmuch as the authority
of commissioners within all major leagues derives substantially from
rules enacted prior to the free agency era, similar litigation in football,
basketball, and hockey is probable. By defining more narrowly the
scope of the commissioner's authority, courts can discourage arbitrary
abuses of his discretion and thereby can foster an equitable yet com-
petitive atmosphere in the operation of professional sports.
220. In a number of cases decided by the Supreme Court, group boycotts have
been held to be per se violations of the Sherman Act. See, e.g., Silver v. New
York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale
Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc.
v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
221. For a discussion of whether the per se test or the rule of reason should
be applied to resolve antitrust disputes arising from the disciplining of profes-
sional athletes by sports leagues and individual clubs see Weistart, supra note
38, at 705-10. See also notes 59-61 supra & accompanying text.
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